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BOOK REVIEWS
Civil Procedure. By Fleming James Jr. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company. 1965. Pp. xx, 747. $10.00.
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an
increasing number of law schools have offered a basic course in civil
procedure, a composite of the courses in pleading and parties, trial
and appellate practice and jurisdiction and judgment. The subject
matter of these courses has always perplexed law students. It is
statutory, unusually technical and analytical and requires an understanding of three basic procedural systems: the common law, the
code and the Federal Rules. The combination of these difficulties
into a single course, given usually in the first year of law school,
has hardly eased the student's burdens. For other first-year courses,
he could seek the assistance of a number of excellent student texts
and the Restatements. But in this area the only such text available
heretofore was Judge Clark's excellent, but now partially dated,
"hornbook" on Code Pleading,' which, as its title suggests, covers
only part of this subject matter. Now Professor James has successfully filled this need with his excellent treatise on civil procedure.
Professor James gives substantial historical and conceptual
treatment to the common law and the code. His attention, however,
is focused on modern procedural reform, as exemplified by the
Federal Rules, and particularly, he states in the preface, on such
developing problems of procedure as the class suit, interpleader, impleader, right to a jury trial and the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 2 This promise is handsomely fulfilled with respect to the right
to a jury trial,3 a subject about which the author has previously
written extensively. On the other hand, the essays on Erie and the
enumerated party problems are only perfunctory exercises. In fact,
the former is essentially an historical narrative of the leading decisions in the Supreme Court. This narrative, made incomplete by
' CLARK, CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1947). The latter
FEDERAL COURTS (1963), concisely covers much of the

half of WRIGHT,

same material as

Professor James' work, but only with respect to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
'JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE at v (1965) [hereinafter cited at JAMES].

"Id.§§ 8.1-.11.
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the recent decision in Hanna v. Plumer,4 terminates with the balancing test advanced in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op,' but regrettably it gives almost no guidelines in applying the test. Byrd
involved an allocation of function between judge and jury, and its
effect on the outcome of the case was possible but not certain.'
7
But in door-closing cases like Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, the
required weighing of competing state and federal policies will surely
have less impact. Conversely, it will have much more impact when
one of the Federal Rules is specifically involved.' And certainly
substantial outcome effects that are ascertainable before suit is filed,
as in Byrd, and necessarily encourage forum shopping are to be
distinguished from outcome effects that arise only after suit is
filedY Minimally such basic guidelines should have been set forth.
The Erie discussion concludes with the observation that "there
are those who believe that no solution is adequate that fails to
return to the original concept of Erie with its simple dichotomy
between substance and procedure."' The location of this statement
suggests it commands the author's sympathy." But its rejection by
the Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust12 and subsequent decisions
necessitates in its advocation something more than a commendation
of its simplicity.
Professor James closes his introduction with "The Life History
of a Lawsuit."' 13 Regrettably it is too short to give a neophyte law
student the flavor of litigation and compares unfavorably with the
'380 U.S. 460 (1965).
356 U.S. 525 (1958). For a discussion of this test, see Note, 44 N.C.L.
REv. 180 (1965).
'Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
1326 U.S. 99 (1945).
' See Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
'Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469 (1965). On the basis of this
distinction, most of the "housekeeping" rules of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have long been thought immune from the reach of the outcome
test. Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1516, 1517 (1953).
determination
10 JAMES § 1.15, at 45.
11 Professor James' dissatisfaction with the contrary view is best illustrated in his discussion of Erie and the long-arm statutes in diversity cases.
JAMEs § 12.12, at 654. In the text of his discussion he cites and discusses
with approval the majority opinion in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc.,
282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960); only in a footnote does he suggest indirectly
that Jaftex has been overruled by the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, in
Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
12 Although Byrd and Hanna establish limits to the outcome determination test, they clearly do not herald a return to a test based on the distincrights and manner and means.
tion1 between § primary
1.16, at 46-53.
JAMES
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excellent garden tour conducted by Professors Louisell and Hazard
in their casebook.14 Since there are few such descriptions of quality
in existence and available in quantity in most law school libraries,
this effort is especially disappointing.
More disturbing is the author's discussion of "The Functions
of Pleading."'" Under the common law and the Code, the pre-trial
stage of litigation was essentially pleading, and thus it was appropriate to speak of the theory and function of pleadings. Under the
Federal Rules and similar systems, however, where discovery and
the pre-trial conference have assumed some of these functions, it
is now more meaningful, I believe, to speak of a theory of the pretrial stage of litigation,' in which these three devices and motion
practice work together to accomplish the four principal goals formerly assumed by the pleadings; namely, notice, discovery of facts,
issue formulation and interception of insufficient claims and defenses." From this broader conception comes a resultant specialization of function and the underlying principle that the various goals
of pre-trial need only be met efficiently at some time during pretrial rather than incompletely by the pleadings.
Professor James seemingly concurs, for he posits a more limited
function for the pleadings and warns that it may be affected by the
expansion of discovery and other pre-trial devices.' s This, however,
is exactly what has happened, but nowhere does he restructure his
theory accordingly. Only in the final discussion of the complaint
under the Federal Rules are the relationships briefly tied together.'"
It is doubtful that at this point the student will connect up everything. By contrast the point is made quickly and clearly by Professor Wright in his treatment of the "Theory of Modern Pleading."

20

It is also not clear that Professor James is in complete sympathy
with "notice" pleading. After quoting the familiar statement in
Conley v. Gibson "that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
14

1 LOUISELL

JAMES

1

& HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE

§§ 2.1-.2.

1-14 (1962).

See Hickaan v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947).
§ 68, at 247 (1963).

1 8 WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS

JAMES

§ 2.1, at 56.

'Id. § 2.11, at 86.
'o WRIGHT,FEDERAL COURTS

§ 68, at 247 (1963).
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entitle him to relief,"21 he suggests that a literal application of this
test "would be sufficient to uphold a complaint which simply recited
that defendant had wronged plaintiff. '2 He concludes, therefore,
that the Supreme Court did not mean to sanction such a complaint,
but only to remind trial judges that plaintiff should be given leave
to amend. The Court had before it, however, no such situation and
in the same opinion acknowledged, in any event, the existence of
certain minimal requirementsY. Furthermore, it is not clear that
it would permit a dismissal, even with leave to amend, of complaints
falling short of these minimal requirements. It could just as well
24
treat the motion to dismiss as one for a more definite statement,
which clearly would be granted. Thus the Court may well have said
that no complaint not clearly deficient on the merits should be dismissed and subjected to the possibility that leave to amend will be
denied or otherwise lost.
In short, Professor James does not make it clear that notice
pleading requires only enough facts to identify plaintiff's claim and
distinguish it from any others he might have. Instead he leaves the
reader to speculate, I think incorrectly, whether such a complaint is
merely an abbreviated code complaint, potentially subject to some
of the requirements of specificity of code pleading.
It would be impossible not to find points of disagreement in
any such treatise, and, therefore, the foregoing should not detract
from its general excellence. It seems destined to join Prosser on
Torts, the student editions of Williston and Corbin on Contracts
and Wright, Federal Courts, as the constant companion and teacher
of students. Many will wisely continue to refer to it in practice.
MARTIN B. Louis
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
SCHOOL OF LAW

U.S. 41, 45-6 (1957).
86.
"all the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement
of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
21355

2JAMES § 2.11, at
2The Court said:

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms ap-

pended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1947).
2

In Garcia v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1951),

a case noted by Professor James with disapproval, JAMES § 2.11, at 88, the
court refused to dismiss a complaint setting forth a claim for defamation
because the publication of the slanderous statement was not specifically
alleged. It did, however, grant defendant's alternative motion for a more

definite statement of the facts relied upon to establish a publication,
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Mr. Justice Murphy and The Bill of Rights. By Harold Norris.
Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana-Publications, Inc., 1965. Pp. xxiii,
568. $7.50.
One of the unique characteristics of the United States Supreme
Court is its capacity to ferret out basic constitutional problems in
litigation on review. In recent years this powerful and sensitive
function has been most noticeable in the civil rights field. Time
and again the Court has sensed the racial discriminations lurking
beneath seemingly innocent procedural or technical rulings of lower
courts and has proceeded to discuss and resolve the constitutional
implications.
This power to probe to the constitutional bare bones of a case
is at once both difficult to execute and delicate in operation. It lends
itself to criticism and dissent and by nature is subject to easy abuse.
Yet the power is one that must attach to a creative and effective
judicial institution. To permit all the issues of federal and constitutional law to be formulated and confined by the oft-glib rulings
of lower courts would soon stultify the Constitution and reduce
the Supreme Court to the role of another step in the appellate routine. More than any other tribunal, the Supreme Court must reserve to itself the task of uncovering, within the framework of the
cases brought before it, those matters which are critical to the
maintenance of a living Constitution.
The Court itself, of course, can perform this function only
within the limitations imposed by its own jurisdictional and procedural rules and by the necessity of obtaining the consent of at
least a majority of the participating Justices. Such limitations, as
respects self-imposed rules, are frequently fluid in nature. But by
the nature of things individual Justices are less inhibited than the
Court itself in their search for. the constitutional solar plexus of a
case; in their concurring and dissenting opinions they can frequently give effective voice to the constitutional equities which the majority refuses to consider. And that voice can sometimes be heard in
later years when a new majority gives heed to the constitutional
insight of the one-time dissenter.
Such a Justice was Frank Murphy, a controversial and often
maligned individual. Within the classic tradition of Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, Black, Rutledge and Douglas, he gave frequent and elo-
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quent testimony to constitutional concepts that are today becoming
the law of the land. And the Murphy technique of probing to underlying constitutional considerations is one, as indicated, that is being
utilized with growing frequency by the present Court majorities.
Intensely devoted to the Bill of Rights, Murphy was often intolerant of the procedural niceties that marked the outer limits of
rulings of lower courts or of the Supreme Court itself. As he said
on one occasion,
The utter disregard for the dignity and the well-being of colored
citizens shown by this record is so pronounced as to demand the
invocation of constitutional condemnation. To decide the case
and to analyze the statute solely upon the basis of legal niceties,
while remaining mute and placid as to the obvious and oppressive
deprivation of constitutional guarantees, is to make the judicial
function something less than it should be.... Racism is far too
virulent today to permit the slightest refusal, in the light of a
Constitution that abhors it, to expose and condemn it wherever
it appears in the course of a statutory interpretation.'
Precisely that approach to the underlying constitutional problems of
a case earned for Murphy the undying enmity of the judicial traditionists.
But Murphy's approach was more than that of simple constitutional condemnation. It was premised upon a thorough review and
analysis of the facts of record and other considerations legitimately
subject to judicial notice which justified, in his mind, the invocation of constitutional principles. His opinions in Bridges v.
WiXon, 2 exposing the relentless crusade to deport one man, in Korematsu v. United States,' revealing the racial motivations for the
wartime exclusion of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast,
and in In re Yamashita,4 discussing the details of the military situation which led to the trial of a conquered Japanese commander,
testify fully to the responsible care with which he treated his constitutional denunciations.
While Murphy's place in the story of the Supreme Court is by
no means limited to that of a prophetic dissenter or of a lonely
worker in the constitutional vineyard, there seems little doubt that
he will be best remembered for his passionate capacity for reach'Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 208-09 (1944).
326 U.S. 135, 157 (1945) (concurring opinion).
S323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
'327 U.S. 1, 26 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
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ing and invoking the constitutional condemnation of governmental
intrusion on individual liberties. He had an innate empathy, rare
enough even among Supreme Court Justices, for the strivings and
the rights of the individual in the never-ending conflict with governmental authority. Yet he was aware of and sympathetic to the
necessities of government; his own long career as a public executive
gave him a balanced viewpoint. The result was a series of concurrences and dissents, and sometimes opinions for the Court, which
cut through "formal concepts and transitory emotions to protect
unpopular citizens against discrimination and persecution."' The
opinions that he wrote in this area were indeed Frank Murphy's
finest hour on the Court.
Professor Norris has compiled and produced in full all of Justice Murphy's opinions dealing with the Bill of Rights. They are
subdivided under the headings of "freedom of speech," "freedom
of religion," "racial discrimination," "fair criminal procedures,"
and "governmental regulation." There is appended a listing of the
217 opinions, covering all subjects, written by Justice Murphy during the nine and a half years he was on the bench. About seventy
of those opinions related in some fashion to the Bill of Rights.
Some attempt is made by Professor Norris, though not in a
particularly critical or penetrating vein, to evaluate Murphy's contributions to the development of the Bill of Rights. Murphy was a
much more complex, controversial and indeed important Justice
than appears from the unalloyed praise heaped upon him by Professor Norris. And interspersed among the collected opinions and
comments are several speeches delivered by Frank Murphy as
Attorney General and various articles that appeared in the Michigan
Law Review concerning Murphy's civil rights and labor law opinions, as well as the author's own previously published article on the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. To these are added the biographical tribute paid Murphy soon after his death by his close friend, Edward
G. Kemp, whose name is unfortunately misspelled in this volume.
The resulting potpourri only bespeaks the need for a more critical
and independent evaluation of the Murphy tenure on the Court.
But this book, merely by providing a compendium of the civil
rights opinions of Justice Murphy, constitutes a valuable reminder
and starting point for those who are interested in the history of
'Falbo v, United States, 320 U.S. 549, 561 (1944).
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the Supreme Court during the turbulent era in which Murphy
served. That era was the essential predicate of the present Court's
approach to the Bill of Rights. Much of what Murphy said and
wrote, and much of what he agreed with in that era, foreshadowed
the current views of the Court. An enigmatic yet enlightened man,
a believer in the simple yet basic rights of the individual, Frank
Murphy wrote a courageous and significant chapter in the annals
of the Court. Much of the raw material of that chapter is reproduced in this volume, thereby making the publication worthwhile.
EUGENE GRESSMAN
MEMBER, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR

